Prof. Dr. Robert Zeithammer (University of California, USA)
Seminar Title
"Causes and consequences of header bidding in display ad auctions"
Date, Time
September 17, 2026, tbd
Location
Ludwigstr. 28 VG, Room 211b
Abstract
Header bidding emerged in part as an attempt to circumvent Google’s dominance in the market for display ad auctions. One consequence was a wholesale shift in auction rules, from second-price auctions to first-price, or “pay-your-bid,” auctions. This change, in turn, imposed substantially greater computational and data demands on bidders. The talk will document how bidders adapted to the new auction format in the face of these increased burdens. Another consequence of header bidding—which effectively introduces a final-round auction among the winners of upstream auctions conducted by participating exchanges—was increased double marginalization arising from the multiple layers of auctions. The mechanism generating double marginalization in these resulting “auctions of auctions” is subtly different from the standard double-marginalization result in posted-price retail markets.